

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.171  
3 March 1964  
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

MAY 11 1964

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 3 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. de CASTRO (Brazil)

64-07542

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. G.R. SAPRA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. M. IONESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.S. MacDONALD  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and seventy-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, the United Kingdom representative, I have the pleasure and the privilege to welcome the new representatives among us: the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Fisher, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, to whom I address on behalf of our Committee our best wishes and welcome; and the leader of the Indian delegation, Mr. Trivedi, Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, who is replacing Mr. Nehru in our Committee and to whom I should also like to extend our best wishes. I hope and trust that they will both make a valuable and useful contribution to the work of our Conference.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): As the first speaker this morning, I should like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our two new colleagues from the United States and from India. In addition to his task as leader of the United States delegation, as we all know, Mr. Fisher will have the high responsibility of acting as one of our two co-Chairmen. I think we must all find it highly satisfactory that, though Mr. Foster has had to absent himself from us for a time, he has found it possible to send his right-hand man to take his place and to fulfil that very important responsibility.

Today we resume our examination of the problem of how to reduce and eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles from the arsenals of States during the disarmament process. When we discussed this problem two weeks ago the representative of the Soviet Union made a statement (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 25 et seq.) which, in my view, did not carry matters much further forward. I was particularly disappointed that Mr. Tsarapkin seemed reluctant to join us in searching out those areas where there is, I believe, some broad measure of agreement between us all (ibid., p.34). He was, indeed, disposed to deprecate the attempts which I had made in this direction at our meeting of 11 February (ENDC/PV.165, pp. 14 et seq.). Nevertheless, as my leader, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, pointed out last Tuesday:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... the United Kingdom approach has always been to seek areas of agreement rather than to stress our disagreements." (ENDC/PV.169, p.14)

The United Kingdom delegation therefore proposes to continue the dialogue with the Soviet delegation on this fundamental problem in as constructive a manner as possible.

I should therefore like to remind the Committee this morning of the various points on which, in my view, there does now seem to be some common ground in the positions of the two sides.

In the first place, we seem to be agreed that, as Mr. Foster pointed out at the meeting of 11 February:

"... a rough balance of destructive power exists now between the two sides." (ENDC/PV.165, p.21)

Mr. Khrushchev made much the same point nearly a year ago when he told the director of the Italian newspaper Il Giorno that the starting-point in our discussions on disarmament and other issues "is the balance of power which has developed in the world today". As Mr. Butler reminded the Committee only last week:

"... we all recognize that a strategically-stable balance of nuclear power has been reached ..." (ENDC/PV.169, p.12)

In the second place, we seem generally agreed that this balance of power, provided it remains stable, maintains peace between the nuclear Powers. Later in my remarks this morning I propose to return to that thought.

In the third place, I believe that we are basically agreed -- and this is a point to which Mr. Butler also referred last week -- that it is in the interests of all of us to see that a stable balance of nuclear power is maintained both before and during the disarmament process. I shall also return to this thought later.

In the fourth place, we are all agreed that this balance should be maintained at progressively lower, safer and less costly levels during the disarmament process than at present. It is useful to remind ourselves, I think, from time to time that we have all subscribed to the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), which among other things laid down that the programme for disarmament should contain, on the one hand, provision for the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction from the military establishments of every nation, and, on the other, measures to maintain international peace and security.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

In the fifth place -- and this follows from my last point -- we are now generally agreed that international peace and security should be maintained during the disarmament process by a combination of two methods. The first would be the retention of nuclear deterrents on both sides. We in the United Kingdom believe this to be fundamental. It is inherent in the approach envisaged in the Western plan (ENDC/30/and Corr.1 and Add. 1, 2, 3), and we are encouraged that the Soviet Government now agrees with us on this point and that the Soviet position as revised by Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), now seems to be closer to our own. The second method would be the introduction of effective international peace-keeping machinery. This point was clearly brought out by the representative of India, Mr. Nehru, when he said at the meeting of 18 February:

"It does not seem to us enough to rely for international peace-keeping on the limited deterrent in the hands of the two great Powers."

(ENDC/PV.167, p.24)

We were glad to note in this connexion that at that same meeting our Soviet colleague declared:

"Undoubtedly the problem of maintaining peace, both in the process of disarmament and after its completion, is of great importance, and the Soviet delegation will be prepared to discuss that question in due course." (ibid., p.28)

As I suggested on 11 February, I think we all recognize:

"... there is an intimate link between the retention and abolition of national nuclear deterrents and the problem of international peace-keeping." (ENDC/PV.165, p.15)

Indeed the United Kingdom delegation has repeatedly pointed out that we cannot eliminate the present sources of security, however unsatisfactory and dangerous they may appear to be, before establishing another equally effective and less dangerous source of security. In our view, that new source would have to be a peace-keeping force under satisfactory political control and possessing sufficient power to deter an aggressor. Until such a force is established, it is clearly unrealistic to expect either side to dismantle completely its present security arrangements.

In the sixth place, as I suggested also on 11 February (ibid., p.18), I believe that both sides may be slightly closer together than hitherto on the sort of situation that should exist towards the end of the disarmament process.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

In the seventh place, we are agreed that the declared nuclear delivery vehicles which should be retained during the disarmament process should be subject to some form of control, at any rate in stages II and III. The modalities of such control still have to be negotiated. But the Soviet Union's willingness to allow control over declared retained nuclear delivery vehicles and their nuclear warheads is a step in the right direction. We have welcomed it as such in the past. I do so again today.

Here, then, are seven broad areas in which we have reached some measure of agreement. My colleagues could no doubt add to that total, but the point I want to stress is that we suffer from no lack of general agreements in this field. On the contrary, I believe we have already quite enough general agreements on which to build. Therefore the time has come when, as Mr. Butler said last week, "we must get down to detailed negotiations" on this and other crucial problems of a general disarmament agreement (ENDC/PV.169, p.19).

What basic problems do we still have to resolve in this particular field? In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, there are at least four such problems. They are difficult problems, and it will take time and patient effort to resolve them; but they are capable of solution and they must be solved.

First, we may still be a long way from agreement on the size of the nuclear deterrents to be retained by both sides during each stage of the disarmament process. As I pointed out on 11 February, the Soviet Government already has our views about the numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained in all three stages (ENDC/PV.165, p.16). But we have no precise idea of what numbers the Soviet Government has in mind to be retained in each stage under Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals. To this extent, therefore, those proposals still remain -- to use a famous phrase -- "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma". Thus, until our Soviet colleague elucidates his Government's own proposals under that particular head, we cannot even begin to assess accurately the magnitude of the differences between our own proposals and theirs.



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Second, we are still a long way from agreement on the nature of the nuclear deterrents to be retained on both sides until the end of stage III. Perhaps I may take two examples. We do not understand why seaborne missiles appear to have been excluded under Mr. Gromyko's revised proposals. Certainly their inclusion would make more sense to us. We have often explained in the past the importance of such missiles from the point of view of their invulnerability and hence their contribution to the stability of the balance of mutual deterrence. I shall not today repeat what we have said on previous occasions about this vital point, but I may wish to do so at some later meeting.

To take another example, we do not understand why anti-missile missiles are included in Mr. Gromyko's revised proposals. If one or other side were to possess a really effective anti-ballistic missile defence system, that -- ironic though it may seem -- would be extremely dangerous, because it would upset the stability of the nuclear balance. It would be extremely dangerous because it would make one side or other think that it was immune from potential nuclear retaliation. Any side which thought this would obviously not be deterred in its actions. We have explained this point in more detail in the past (ENDC/PV.112, pp. 9, 10; PV/117, pp.15, 16).

Third -- and this is related to my first point -- we cannot yet begin to assess with any degree of accuracy the differences between us on the rate and the phasing of the reductions of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. All we know is that under Mr. Gromyko's proposals the Soviet Government apparently proposes that the vast bulk of the reduction should take place in stage I. But, as Mr. Butler said last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.169, p.13), it seems to us quite unrealistic, for all sorts of reasons, to suggest that almost all the defensive nuclear armoury on both sides should be destroyed in stage I of the disarmament process. Today I only want to point out that, if the Soviet Government feels so strongly that stage I of the disarmament process should be, so to speak, almost sacrosanct, I find it difficult to understand why it subscribed to the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which, as the Committee will recall, did not envisage the vast bulk of disarmament being carried out in stage I. On the contrary, this important document laid down, among other things:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages" -- I repeat, "by stages" -- "until it is completed ..."

(ENDC/5, p.2).

As far as the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles is concerned, the latest Soviet proposals appear to depart from this principle.

Perhaps more importantly, the Soviet Government has not explained to us how it would be possible to avoid the danger of serious imbalances and the verification difficulties which would arise in stage I if almost total abolition of nuclear delivery vehicles takes place then. The Canadian representative has referred to these crucial problems on a number of occasions in the past; and, frankly, I do not think that we have had satisfactory answers from our Soviet colleagues.

The fourth main area of disagreement is, of course, the question of peace-keeping arrangements which must be introduced and put into operation before national nuclear deterrents can finally be dismantled. I shall not dwell on that point today. I wish only to express the hope that we can discuss this whole question of peace-keeping in the fairly near future.

Those, then, are some of the areas of disagreement between the two sides. I have listed them -- and of course there may well be others -- in the hope that at future meetings the Committee will agree to concentrate on trying to resolve them.

In concluding my remarks this morning I should like to revert to two points which I have mentioned earlier: namely, that we seem generally agreed that the present balance of power, provided it remains stable, maintains peace between the nuclear Powers, and that it is in the interests of us all to see a stable balance maintained both before and during disarmament. Those are factual statements; they are not moral judgements, which, I respectfully suggest, are out of place here.

What do we mean by a strategically-stable balance? We mean, I suggest, that because the effects of these weapons are so great, no nuclear Power can use them for aggressive purposes without knowing that a completely unacceptable retaliatory blow cannot now be prevented. The Soviet Union cannot launch a nuclear attack on the United States without knowing that it would invite a devastating counter-blow. The United States cannot launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union without a devastating blow being returned. The United States Secretary of Defense,

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Mr. McNamara, made this quite clear in a speech in New York last November. He pointed out that the degree of retaliatory capacity of the Soviet Union is such that the damage it could inflict on the United States and its allies -- in his own words -- "no matter what we do to limit it, remains extremely high" (ENDC/PV.165, p.21) If this is true for the United States, so it is for the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom is, of course, in the same position. If that is so, then we have at least some assurance that peace will be preserved.

There have been a number of occasions when there could have been a war in Europe or elsewhere in recent years. Such a war would have spread and might well have involved the majority, perhaps all, of the nations represented at this table. An arrangement which makes such a war unlikely is clearly, to quote Mr. Butler once more, "in the interests of all to see maintained" (ENDC/PV.169, p.12) throughout the disarmament process until we have something better to put in its place.

I believe that it is fundamental to our work here that we all understand this position and the technical realities underlying it.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Allow me, first of all, on behalf of the Italian delegation, to extend a welcome to Mr. Fisher and Mr. Trivedi, who have taken over the leadership of their respective delegations -- the delegations of the United States and India. I most sincerely wish them good and fruitful work in this Committee. I should also like to assure Mr. Fisher of the Italian delegation's confidence in the views he will be expressing as co-Chairman with regard to our Conference's debates.

Mr. Fisher is taking his seat as co-Chairman of the Committee the day after statements made on the Conference's work by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko. I only know of these statements from a press summary and should not like to comment on them today. I sincerely hope that when we have the full text<sup>1/</sup> they will be found to be less harsh than the impression we are left with on reading the newspapers today. For the present I should merely like to quote one sentence which I read this morning in the Journal de Genève and which, I am sure, will meet with general approval. Mr. Gromyko said that we should stop quarrelling about who will win the armaments race. Here Mr. Gromyko is quite right, and I should like to add in my turn: let us stop quarrelling about who will win in our discussions on procedure in this Committee.

1/ Circulated as ENDC/127\*

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

We have often repeated in this Committee that in our work here there should be no winners and no losers. Quite sincerely I do not believe, and do not want to believe, that the difficulties we have encountered, and that we shall continue to encounter in working out our agenda, constitute a serious deadlock. True, I had hoped that in a better international atmosphere it would have been easier for us this year to draw up this agenda by common consent. We still think so; but let us not forget that last year the Committee worked without an agenda and, as you know, this did not prevent it from concluding important agreements.

As I pointed out in my last statement (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 10 et seq.), the United States and Soviet delegations have not yet finished describing their proposals in detail. We still have not got the complete picture. If we have encountered certain difficulties on the first questions -- and, by the way, in the past serious difficulties have not been encountered at the outset, even, for example, on the question of nuclear tests -- we should not let ourselves be discouraged.

Let us not forget too that some of the proposals are common to the United States (ENDC/120) and Soviet lists (ENDC/123), and that for these at least some basis for agreement and collaboration should be found. Let us therefore continue to work with patience, good will and perseverance. Let us always try to avoid in our debates polemical overtones, and expressions that are threatening or too disagreeable. Such things seemed to belong to the past, and I hope that this is still the case. As far as the Italian delegation is concerned, we shall do all we can to make it true.

The Committee has heard today a very interesting statement by Sir Paul Mason, which my delegation followed with the greatest attention. I think that the United Kingdom representative was right in emphasizing the numerous points on which an identity of views, or at least a rapprochement, exists. In an earlier speech my delegation also indicated, perhaps in less detail, what progress had been achieved in our debate on general and complete disarmament, and expressed its very sincere satisfaction on that score.

Sir Paul Mason also made a point of indicating the items which need further study in order that existing divergencies may be eliminated. He almost sketched out an agenda to be followed when studying general and complete disarmament. My

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

delegation greatly appreciates the efforts of the United Kingdom representative to lead the negotiations towards ever more concrete and constructive goals. I should therefore like to try in my statement today to help to clarify, if possible, certain problems which Sir Paul Mason raised and which still await solution.

On 18 February, in my statement on general and complete disarmament and on the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), I said I would revert later to two subjects which directly or indirectly referred to that proposal: namely, verification and the setting up of an international peace force (ENDC/PV.167, p.14). I should like to speak on these subjects today without dwelling on them at too great length, for the subject-matter is well known. I should merely like to recall and to clarify, without entering into controversy, certain considerations already outlined previously. These considerations apply not only to the Gromyko proposal, but also to any other proposal which tends to concentrate too drastic measures during the first stage of disarmament. If in our desire -- understandable but unrealistic -- to make very rapid progress towards total disarmament, we try to accumulate during the first stage disarmament measures that are too drastic, we shall find ourselves faced with very complex and complicated problems, particularly in the fields of verification and the peaceful organization of the world.

Let us consider first the problem of verification. If I have understood the Soviet delegation aright, the Gromyko proposal envisages two categories of control: control over the number of missiles eliminated and control over the remaining missiles, exercised at the declared launching sites. As Sir Paul Mason pointed out (supra, p. 8) these proposals represent some progress. The previous Soviet proposals limited control to the armaments destroyed, and excluded the possibility of investigating the armaments that still remained.

We therefore welcome with satisfaction this evolution in Soviet thinking; but we cannot help wondering whether the control now envisaged by the Soviet delegation in accordance with the Gromyko proposal is really sufficient. In this connexion there are two problems which we should not forget, the first being that of the further production of missiles after the conclusion of a restrictive agreement. This problem is a relatively minor one, for I think it should not be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept control over all plants capable of manufacturing missiles which have been declared. Nevertheless, this is a point which should be clarified.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

A more serious and very much more difficult problem is that of concealed weapons. Everyone realizes that this is not an easy problem to solve. To make sure that no weapon had been illegally retained somewhere, in some country, the control required would be so extensive, particularly in the case of very large countries, as to be practically impossible. To insist on such control would really mean that disarmament was not wanted.

For our part, we have always supported the idea that disarmament implies a certain amount of courage, paying due regard to the dangers that now exist if there is no disarmament and if the armaments race is continued. We should therefore seek a formula giving a reasonable assurance that no weapons are concealed and that such weapons do not create an imbalance which could seriously endanger the side that had loyally carried out the disarmament treaty.

Two factors should, in that case, be taken into account: the destructive power of the weapons which might be concealed, and the reciprocal military situations of the two sides.

The more dangerous the weapon, the more necessary it is to make certain that it is really eliminated; moreover, the further the process of disarmament has advanced, the more extensive, and, if possible, efficient the control should be.

At the beginning of the process of disarmament the military organization of States should not yet, according to the proposal, have undergone extensive reduction. Sufficient resources will remain in place to combat any danger of hidden weapons without running fatal risks. It is therefore not essential that control should be very extensive or developed. It is later, when disarmament is much more advanced, that the existence of a few concealed weapons will be sufficient to create a dangerous situation and that, consequently, control should be complete. That is true particularly if the weapons in question are nuclear missiles.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

It is for those reasons that the Soviet draft treaty also envisages at the end of the third stage complete freedom for the inspectors, the right of supervision in all countries and the right to go to any place without exception.

Naturally, even in those conditions there will be no absolute certainty that no weapons have been concealed. But the unlimited freedom of action of the international controllers constitutes in itself a valid deterrent against possible violations of the treaty, while at this stage of disarmament, mutual confidence --- which naturally could not be complete at the end of the first stage --- would be at its maximum.

We believe, therefore, that in connexion with Mr. Gromyko's proposal there are complex problems of verification which we should study in detail and work out in the light of the considerations I have just expounded. It would certainly be dangerous to apply the Gromyko proposal without any guarantees against possible concealed missiles; it would be contrary to the very meaning and aims of this proposal which consist, if we have understood it correctly, in providing as soon as possible full mutual security against nuclear aggression. At the same time, we fully realize that since, even under the Gromyko proposal, disarmament will not be complete at the end of the last stage, control --- according to the old formula: "the same amount of control as of disarmament" --- cannot be complete either. It is between those two requirements that the problem of verification arises, and it is with those requirements in mind that we must try to solve it.

Somewhat similar problems, though in a very different field, would arise in connexion with the creation of an international peace force if Mr. Gromyko's proposal were applied. As in the case of control, we envisage a gradual and progressive process for the setting up of the peace-keeping machinery and of an international force. At the beginning, during the first stage, the States will not have given up their right to defend themselves; they will still retain 70 per cent of their armaments, and will still be able to ensure their security out of their own resources, although with reduced forces. It is therefore conceivable that at that stage the international force will still be in embryo, although, of course, already possessing some effectiveness. It is only later, and still gradually, during the second and third stages, that the international force will acquire sufficient strength to assume complete responsibility for maintaining general security within the duly-reinforced framework of the United Nations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

But if at the end of the first stage the existing alliances were already deprived of almost the whole of their chief means of defence, we should be faced with the following alternatives: either general security would not be sufficiently protected, or a large international peace force would have to be hastily improvised. I do not want to imply that this second alternative would not be possible; but it would not be easy, and in any case, as things are at present, it is not included in the Gromyko proposal.

Thus we come to the same conclusion both on verification and on the international peace force: if we overload the first stage with disarmament measures that are too drastic and practically complete, we must also overload it with very extensive and almost complete measures of control, and create an international peace force of some magnitude immediately. Otherwise the disarmament measures would not be accompanied by adequate guarantees of a similar weight, and general security would be compromised.

The remarks I have made either at the meeting of 18 February (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 10 et seq.) or today aim at going more deeply into the Gromyko proposal and at acquiring a better understanding of its full scope. As I have already had occasion to state, this proposal testifies to an effort worthy of our interest. The long analysis I have made of it here, though not, I must admit, free of criticism, shows how seriously and with what goodwill my delegation has received the Soviet proposal. However, it remains clear that this proposal raises many problems, as Sir Paul Mason mentioned this morning, and I too have wished to point out some of them.

At this stage of our discussions I would certainly not like to draw any conclusions. They would be hasty and probably erroneous. I think that the Soviet delegation will be willing to examine the problems which, in our opinion, stem from the Gromyko proposal and to discuss them with us, at the same time clearly stating its point of view.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): I should like to associate myself with the speakers who have preceded me in welcoming the new leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Fisher, and the new leader of the Indian delegation, Mr. Trivedi, and to express the hope that their work in the Committee will help us to achieve the positive results which are so much needed.



(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

My delegation listened with great interest to the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy. We will study them carefully, of course, and we reserve the right to express an opinion on them at a later stage.

On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I should like today to make a few observations on the course of the deliberations in the Committee so far regarding the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly that the so-called "nuclear umbrella" should be retained until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

First of all, I should like to comment briefly on the manner in which the delegations of the Western Powers have been discussing this subject. We welcome the fact that after some hesitation they have finally agreed to discuss this significant proposal. At the beginning they evaded taking a position on the proposal, contending that it lacked clarity. However, they evidently realized that such an approach could not be maintained, and began to change their tactics.

After listening to the statements they made at our recent meetings --- and this morning too --- we must state that it was not a change for the better. Our discussion of the Soviet Government's proposal will certainly not be well served by unfounded conclusions such as those contained in particular in the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, at our meeting of 11 February, when he asserted:

"Under Mr. Gromyko's latest proposals, as I understand them, the Soviet Government has now declared its willingness, however reluctant, to continue to live with the threat and danger of nuclear war throughout the disarmament process". (ENDC/PV.165, p.16)

The United Kingdom representative brought his peculiar argumentation to the conclusion that, since both proposals --- that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States --- now allegedly admit the possibility of a nuclear war until the end of the disarmament process, the main objections of the socialist countries to the Western proposal have lost much of their validity. The representative of the United Kingdom tried to convince us that at present there is no difference between the

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

approaches of the socialist and the Western countries to the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and, accordingly, to the elimination of the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war; since, as he asserted, the socialist countries themselves now recognize the importance of the so-called nuclear deterrent as the main guarantee for preserving peace.

The question arises: what were the facts from which the representative of the United Kingdom proceeded in formulating his conclusions? The Soviet proposal for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage was formulated with full clarity and leaves no doubt about its nature. Since the proposal was submitted, the representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have clearly pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States would retain only such agreed, strictly limited numbers of missiles and nuclear warheads as could not be used to unleash and wage a nuclear war.

It is evident that the difference between the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and the Soviet proposal for their complete liquidation in the first stage, while retaining a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the third stage, is a difference of quality. Therefore the United States should not try to attribute to the Soviet proposal the well-known shortcomings of its own plan.

As regards the guarantees for keeping the peace, it knows very well that, in our firmly-held view, the nuclear deterrent provides a much too shaky basis. Contrary to what the United States believes, we are convinced that the best guarantee of peace is the implementation of resolute and effective measures in the disarmament field, primarily of such measures as would eliminate the threat of a nuclear war at the very beginning of the disarmament process.

We do not think our work is facilitated if a completely adverse meaning is intentionally attributed to the proposals of one side by participants in the discussion. We cannot avoid using the expression "intentionally", for the substance of the Soviet proposal has evidently been clear to the Western Powers from the very start. This is confirmed by statements made by their representatives, especially by what was said on 11 February by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, namely:

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

"... it appears that the Soviet proposal would eliminate all other nuclear delivery vehicles and provide for steep reductions in land-based intercontinental missiles to some very low level on both sides by the end of stage I. That level would then be continued to the end of disarmament.

If that is so, we appear to be rather far from agreement". (ENDC/PV.165, p.22)

It is clear from the words of Mr. Foster what is the real reason why our negotiations cannot move ahead. It is not because the Soviet proposal lacks clarity or would have technical shortcomings; it is because the Western Powers have been opposed to resolute measures to eliminate the danger of nuclear war from the beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament. This was once more confirmed by the statement in this Committee by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, who on 25 February qualified the Soviet proposal as ---

"... representational or of propaganda value rather than of disarmament value". (ENDC/PV.169, p. 13)

The proposal advanced by the Government of the Soviet Union is a manifestation of its sincere effort for a rapprochement of views and for achieving agreement. As such it was highly appreciated by numerous delegations at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly and in this Committee as well. It was rightly qualified as the most significant proposal submitted in the field of nuclear disarmament since the presentation of the draft treaties for general and complete disarmament in 1962. Yet now the representative of one of the leading NATO countries describes it as a proposal of propaganda rather than of disarmament value. We believe, however, that the time for the Western Powers to evade a businesslike consideration of various proposals under the pretext of their alleged "propaganda value" is gone, and that the urgency to make progress in disarmament negotiations necessitates that it should never come back.

A characteristic feature of the way in which the Western Powers attempt to weaken the significance of the Soviet proposal is the fact that they use old arguments, refuted long ago, which they used against the original proposal for a complete liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I (ENDC/2).

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

An example of such argumentation was also the intervention of the leader of the Italian delegation on 18 February. Mr. Cavalletti summarized the objections to the "nuclear umbrella" in an attempt to prove that it upsets the military balance in favour of the socialist countries (ENDC/PV.167, pp.11 et seq.).

My delegation has no intention of repeatedly setting straight the unfounded assertions that the socialist countries at the present time maintain a superiority in conventional armed forces and armaments. The facts that the Committee has heard, including what authoritative military experts from the United States and NATO have said in this respect, fully refute such contentions. In assessing the actual balance of forces in this field, there is hardly any sense in referring to the impressions of "the man in the street" on which Mr. Cavalletti based, to some extent, his argumentation.

Moreover, it is well known that the Soviet Union, in its effort to meet the position of the Western Powers, agreed as far back as 1962 that the limit for the reduction of the numerical levels of the armed forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union should be set at 1.9 million men by the end of stage I (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.10). If, then, the delegations of the NATO countries regard the limit of the armed forces to be retained at the end of stage I as too high and possibly threatening the security of Western Europe, nothing stands in the way of their proposing a new, sufficiently low level that would satisfy them.

Equally unconvincing is the objection that the levels of armed forces to be retained by the Soviet Union in the course of stage I, together with the commensurately-reduced armed forces of the other socialist countries, might be easily and rapidly stationed wherever desired. Can you imagine that such a country as the Soviet Union, covering a large geographical area and having borders of such length, might so concentrate the armed forces that it will have retained by the end of stage I only in its western regions, and disregard the need to protect its borders in the Far and Middle East in regions which are many thousands of kilometres remote from the European military theatre?

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

In connexion with the creation of a "nuclear umbrella", much to our surprise, the representative of Italy questioned the security of Western Europe, contending that, while all nuclear delivery vehicles would be eliminated in Western Europe, they would be retained in a minimum and strictly limited number in the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.167, p.13). Having in mind the clearly defensive nature of a "nuclear umbrella", we find it difficult to follow the reasoning of the representative of Italy. We cannot understand his conclusion that the limited number of intercontinental missiles and other means of delivery -- which only the Soviet Union and the United States would retain for defensive purposes -- retained by the Soviet Union would endanger the security of western European countries to a greater extent than that to which the same means retained by the United States would endanger the security of socialist countries in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Other objections advanced by the representative of Italy are similarly unfounded and have been refuted many times in the past, in particular his reference to the so-called geographical factor, or the dismantling of various military installations within NATO, as if the proposals of the socialist countries did not provide for strict reciprocity.

I should like to deal now with the manner of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as envisaged in the proposals of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3). Contrary to the proposal of the Soviet Union, which provides for the elimination of all delivery vehicles during stage I of general and complete disarmament, with the exception of those that would be retained as a "nuclear umbrella", the Western Powers have not abandoned stressing the doubtful advantages of the so-called percentage reduction.

The delegations of the socialist countries have made it clear why such a procedure is unacceptable to them: it would not eliminate the danger of a nuclear war until practically the end of the process of general and complete disarmament. At the beginning of stage III -- that is, after a lapse of more than six years, according to the United States proposal -- States would have at their disposal more than sufficient quantities of delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons to fight a nuclear war themselves on a wide scale.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

On 18 February the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, convincingly analysed the situation in respect of intercontinental missiles (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 26 et seq.). The situation is, however, even more obvious if we take into account all delivery vehicles existing today. According to data made public in the West, in 1963 the United States had, for example, 3,390 delivery vehicles of a strategic nature of different types (Congressional Records, 16 January 1963 pp. 393-416). On the basis of a percentage reduction, the United States would retain at the beginning of stage II more than 2,000 delivery vehicles, and at the beginning of stage III more than 1,000 strategic delivery vehicles of different categories. Surely this cannot be called disarmament.

The Western Powers try to support the idea of the percentage reduction by asserting that this would be the way to preserve the existing equilibrium, because the forces of both sides would be reduced in a balanced way. It is generally known, however, that the so-called percentage reduction in itself is far from providing a guarantee for preserving the existing balance of power which is emphasized in such strong terms by NATO countries, as we have heard again this morning.

It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which, through percentage reductions, one country might gain unilateral military advantages at the expense of another. Let me adduce one hypothetical example. One country, oriented exclusively towards safeguarding its own defence and security, maintains only the means necessary for this purpose. Another country, following other aims, whose policy in the field of armaments is affected by other factors --- for example, economic --- continues to accumulate destructive weapons irrespective of its "over-kill" capacity. It is evident that through a percentage reduction the defensive ability of the first country would be substantially weakened, while the other country would continue to have available more than sufficient means to unleash and conduct an aggressive nuclear war.

Moreover, it has been said here that the Western Powers themselves are not consistent on this question and are far from applying the percentage reduction method in all cases. For instance, it is known that they do not propose reduction by percentage in regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons, or the reduction of levels of armed forces, or in other spheres; nor have they agreed to apply this method in the reduction of military budgets.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

In this connexion I should like to make a few observations on the United States proposal for the freeze of strategic delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). The representatives of the Western Powers try to present this proposal as an effective means to halt the dangerous development in the field of armaments.

Do you think that in the situation prevailing today, when more than sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles have been accumulated in the world, a freeze of certain types of them could have any practical result, since it would not in any way contribute to diminishing the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind? That threat can, in our view, be eliminated only by the destruction of such means. If I may, I should like to recall here what was so aptly said by the late President Kennedy in his address to the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961:

"Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." (A/PV.1013, paragraph 50)

In this respect my delegation fully shares the view of the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Blusztajn, who rightly pointed out here on 18 February that the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles was rather a step backwards when compared with the former United States proposals, especially if we were to understand it as a prerequisite to starting the process of disarmament (ENDC/PV.167, p.17).

How negligible the effectiveness of a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles as proposed by the United States would be was convincingly shown by the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thorneycroft, when in relation to the "freeze" proposal he declared in Parliament on 28 February 1964:

"The United States are now working out their plans and they have given the British Government an explicit assurance that nothing in their proposals would inhibit them from honouring their Nassau agreement to supply Polaris missiles". (The Times, 29 February 1964)

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

Therefore it is evident that the proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is not an effective measure, and that it would contribute neither to achieving progress in the deliberations on general and complete disarmament nor even to halting nuclear and missile armament.

The position taken by the delegations of the Western countries on the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union to retain a "nuclear umbrella" during the whole process of general and complete disarmament is causing serious difficulties in our negotiations here. The cause of those difficulties, as we have pointed out (ENDC/PV.165, pp. 6 et seq.), is not any lack of clarity or shortcomings in the Soviet proposal, the substance of which is very well understood by the Western Powers. It is the unwillingness of the countries members of NATO to take resolute steps in the direction of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war -- which is also confirmed by their own proposals.

We do not give up hope that, in the interest of making progress in our discussions, the Western Powers will finally harmonize their deeds with the readiness which they have so often proclaimed to make disarmament a reality, and will accept the Soviet proposal in principle. Such a step would open up new possibilities as regards the primary objective of our Committee: general and complete disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to associate myself with previous speakers in welcoming our new colleagues in the negotiations -- the representative of the United States, Mr. Adrian Fisher, and the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi -- and to wish them every success in their activities here in the Committee.

The discussion of the Soviet proposal for the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1), in the light of the Soviet Government's recent proposal for the retention of a so-called "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process (ibid., Add.1), has been instructive in many respects and provides food for a number of conclusions. This discussion has not led to agreement. It has shown that the negotiations in



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

our Committee have reached a deadlock. At the same time it has revealed sufficiently clearly to all the members of the Committee the reason why there is no progress. We consider it appropriate to dwell on this aspect of the matter in our statement today, so that the Western Powers may realize the dangerous consequences of their approach to the question of nuclear disarmament. It is essential that the Western Powers should think over their position, draw the appropriate conclusions and make the necessary rectifications, so as to clear the way for progress in our negotiations.

At present everyone agrees that the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament, of the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, is the key to the solution of the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. The elimination of the danger of a nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament is an indispensable condition for a genuinely realistic programme of general and complete disarmament. In these days the seriousness and effectiveness of any proposal on general and complete disarmament are determined, first of all, by the extent to which it solves the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

In a number of statements the Soviet delegation has shown in detail that the Soviet Government's proposal on general and complete disarmament is fully in keeping with this condition, this criterion. The Western delegations have been unable to put forward any well-founded objections to it.

On the other hand, we have shown in a concrete analysis that the United States proposal (ENDC/30) for a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would have the result that the possibility of unleashing and waging a thermonuclear war would be maintained to the very end of the disarmament process. At the meeting on 18 February we showed by concrete figures that, if we start disarming according to the method proposed to us by the United States and its Western allies, the result will be that in the third, that is, the last stage of disarmament, the main nuclear Powers will have far more thermonuclear weapons than they have at present (ENDC/PV.167, p.32). Mr. Foster did not rebut our statements, and would have been unable to do so even if he had wished to, because the actual facts and figures afford no possibility or grounds for doing so.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

That fact alone, which reveals with the utmost clarity the incompatibility of a percentage reduction of nuclear armaments by stages with the task of disarmament, is a convincing argument in favour of the Soviet proposal. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Committee have expressed the view that the Soviet proposal for the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited number of missiles is unacceptable to the West because it provides for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of all delivery vehicles except those intended to form the "nuclear umbrella". But we may well ask the Western representatives the question: why is this solution of the disarmament problem unacceptable to you? The representatives of the Western Powers have no satisfactory answer, construed not from the standpoint of the NATO military staffs but from the standpoint of the interests of disarmament.

We should like to draw attention to the fact that representatives of the non-aligned countries are in favour of such an approach as would, in the very beginning of disarmament, ensure for the peoples genuine and not fictitious security -- security based on the speediest elimination of the threat of thermonuclear war hanging over the peoples, and not on the desire to maintain this threat right up to the end of the disarmament process. Attention has been drawn to that aspect of the matter by the representative of India, Mr. Nehru (ENDC/PV.167, pp.20 et seq.), by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan (ENDC/PV.169, pp.29 et seq.), and by other representatives. We should also like to note that several members of the Committee have pointed out that the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" provides a solution to the problem of eliminating the danger of nuclear war as speedily as possible, and at the same time goes towards meeting the views of the Western Powers concerning additional guarantees for their security.

The Soviet proposal, as the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic said at our meetings on 18 and 25 February (ENDC/PV.167, p.21, and PV.169, p.30), is a practical means of bringing the positions of West and East closer together in order to reach agreement on the key question of nuclear armaments. Our proposal is a healthy compromise and a good basis for agreement.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

At today's meeting the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, and the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, again pretended that the Soviet proposal on a "nuclear umbrella" was not clear to them. But the use of such methods in our discussions can no longer impress anyone, as the Soviet proposal had been explained from every angle in the most patient and painstaking manner at many meetings of the Committee. On the last occasion I once again explained it in a summary way at our meeting of 18 February (ENDC/PV.167, pp.25 et seq.), and Sir Paul Mason, who was present at that meeting, knows about the explanations given by the Soviet side. Today Sir Paul Mason asked why the Soviet proposal does not include missiles of the Polaris type. Mr. Cavalletti, for his part, was anxious in his statement today about control over remaining missiles, and in this connexion expressed doubt about the extent to which the control over remaining missiles at the launching pads themselves, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would be effective and sufficient.

I answer Sir Paul Mason and Mr. Cavalletti as follows. We propose leaving missiles only in the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union; in the first place, not for the purpose of maintaining the possibility of waging a nuclear war or for delivering a surprise nuclear blow. We propose leaving a limited number of missiles as a measure aimed at providing additional guarantees against the risk of being attacked. But the main guarantee consists in the disarmament measures proposed by us, in the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles except for an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles in the Soviet Union and the United States, to be verified on the spot.

Secondly, the missiles retained in the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States could be easily kept under permanent control -- which is what Mr. Cavalletti is particularly worried and concerned about -- whereas Polaris and similar missiles would not fit in with either of these requirements. Being located on board nuclear submarines cruising secretly in all seas and oceans, Polaris missiles are a means of aggression, a means of secret, concealed surprise attack. This means of aggression, of surprise attack, is in fact not amenable to permanent control. That is the answer we can give you. If we are concerned to have remaining missiles kept under permanent control, they should be missiles which are in the actual territories of the Soviet Union and the United States, missiles

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

which will be under permanent control and the presence of which can be verified at any time at their launching pads.

Further, Sir Paul Mason asked why anti-missile missiles figured in the Soviet proposal. The question is a strange one. On the one hand, the Western Powers tell us that they would like to have the most reassuring additional guarantees of protection against surprise attack; and on the other hand they apparently object to such means of defence, such means of protection against surprise attack, as anti-missile missiles. After all, these are a means of defence. How can one, on the one hand, demand guarantees against surprise attack and, on the other hand, object to including in the "nuclear umbrella" the means which can protect a country against surprise attack? There you have an obvious contradiction, Sir Paul. We propose the inclusion of anti-missile missiles in the "nuclear umbrella" because they are a means of defence which can be an additional safeguard in the event of a surprise attack.

On the day he left Geneva, Mr. Foster stated in the Committee: "The real hope for security is to break the vicious circle of the arms race". (ENDC/PV.170, p.47) Mr. Foster also said the most urgent task of this committee is to maintain and to increase the momentum given to international relations by the Moscow Treaty of 1963. He urged us to find new and broader areas of agreement, and emphasized that this was a very urgent though difficult task. (ibid., p.46)

Every one of us can agree with everything Mr. Foster said at the 170th meeting on the day of his departure for Washington. Every one of us can welcome those statements. But they all turn out to be only words. When it comes to deeds, the Western Powers in fact refuse to discuss the Soviet proposals and block any possibility of reaching agreement on measures aimed at real disarmament. It seems to us that, since Mr. Foster admits that the real security of States does not lie in the arms race but in breaking the vicious circle of the arms race, the "new and broader areas of agreement" which Mr. Foster urges us to find should be looked for among measures aimed at real disarmament, at bringing about a slowing-down of the arms race.

The Soviet proposals for a so-called "nuclear umbrella" and the proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension (ENDC/123)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

open up wide opportunities for agreement. Therefore we urgently appeal to the United States and its Western partners to take the path of agreeing on measures that would lead to real disarmament and to a real slowing-down of the armaments race, and not to try to substitute for such measures proposals that would lead to neither, proposals the aim of which is to maintain the threat of a nuclear war until the end of the disarmament process, an aim which is contrary to the very idea of disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 171st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Josue de Castro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Italy, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday 5 March 1964, at 10.30 am."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

